Black Swans and White Whales
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Information
Session Lead: Kenneth Verosub, UC Davis/State Dept.
Members: 54
Latest Activity: May 28 2010
Black Swans and White Whales
To see presentations from the Black Swans and White Whales Session at the Understanding Risk conference, click HERE.
Welcome to "Black Swans and White Whales", the discussion formerly known as "Atypical Risk"
In European society, as far back as Roman times, the black swan was symbolic of something that could not possibly exist. Then in 1697, the Dutch explorer Willem de Vlamingh discovered black swans in Australia, and the certainly about their non-existence came to an abrupt end. Knowledge of the existence of great white whales (à la Moby Dick) probably goes back to the time humans first started venturing out into the open ocean, but white whales have always been recognized as being extremely rare. Thus, black swans are a metaphor for events that radically change the way we look at the world while white whales are a metaphor for very low probability events that we know exist.
This discussion will focus on high-impact, low-probability events, both natural and human-made, that have the capability of wreaking havoc on human populations, i.e., natural disasters. Our knowledge of the existence of some of these goes back hundreds of years while our recognition of the existence of others is much more recent and has often arisen quite suddenly. The former are like white whales; the latter are like black swans. Our ultimate goal in this discussion is to determine how an examination of high-impact, low-probability events can help us understand similar events that occur more frequently. There are several ancillary questions and issues that come out of this broad goal. My task is to identify those questions as they emerge and encourage discussion threads about them. Your task is to engage in vigorous and lively discussions about any aspect of the topic that interests you. Those who have accepted the invitation to join the group range from people who are familiar with specific high-impact, low-probability events (asteroid impacts, massive solar flares, nuclear winter, terrorist attacks, nuclear and chemical accidents, transportation disasters, etc.) to individuals who look at the analysis and assessment of risk, the perception and psychology of risk, and individual and organizational responses to risk.
I think it makes the most sense to simply start the discussion and see where it goes. To that end, I invite each of you to provide a brief description of the interests and background that you bring to the table as well as a statement of the specific question or question that you would like to see the group address. - KLV
Welcome to "Black Swans and White Whales", the discussion formerly known as "Atypical Risk"
In European society, as far back as Roman times, the black swan was symbolic of something that could not possibly exist. Then in 1697, the Dutch explorer Willem de Vlamingh discovered black swans in Australia, and the certainly about their non-existence came to an abrupt end. Knowledge of the existence of great white whales (à la Moby Dick) probably goes back to the time humans first started venturing out into the open ocean, but white whales have always been recognized as being extremely rare. Thus, black swans are a metaphor for events that radically change the way we look at the world while white whales are a metaphor for very low probability events that we know exist.
This discussion will focus on high-impact, low-probability events, both natural and human-made, that have the capability of wreaking havoc on human populations, i.e., natural disasters. Our knowledge of the existence of some of these goes back hundreds of years while our recognition of the existence of others is much more recent and has often arisen quite suddenly. The former are like white whales; the latter are like black swans. Our ultimate goal in this discussion is to determine how an examination of high-impact, low-probability events can help us understand similar events that occur more frequently. There are several ancillary questions and issues that come out of this broad goal. My task is to identify those questions as they emerge and encourage discussion threads about them. Your task is to engage in vigorous and lively discussions about any aspect of the topic that interests you. Those who have accepted the invitation to join the group range from people who are familiar with specific high-impact, low-probability events (asteroid impacts, massive solar flares, nuclear winter, terrorist attacks, nuclear and chemical accidents, transportation disasters, etc.) to individuals who look at the analysis and assessment of risk, the perception and psychology of risk, and individual and organizational responses to risk.
I think it makes the most sense to simply start the discussion and see where it goes. To that end, I invite each of you to provide a brief description of the interests and background that you bring to the table as well as a statement of the specific question or question that you would like to see the group address. - KLV
Discussion Forum
Members (54)
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Comment wall (6 comments)
How about we throw in pink elephants, by which I mean the illusory (or less-risky) perils we drunkenly fear while ignoring the certainties? Does anybody else believe policymakers shortchange boring old hurricanes floods and earthquakes so they can pursue al Qaida in Altoona? (Pink elephants are what Americans say drunkards see in their delirium. Altoona is a Pennsylvania town of 50,000.) .
Dear All, A lot is happening around which fits the topic of atypical risk, Black Swans and White Whales". Pl do join us on "Sub-Regional Risk Assessments as a Tool for National Investment Planning". tks Sushil Gupta General Manager, Risk Modeling and Insrance RMSI .
Complacency vs resiliency are areas to see in the field of risk analysis. While we have done lots of DRM integration to most of our regular programs be it from the government or INGO, academe or in the church or religious organizations or simply being an agnostic, creation of a state or condition of resilence must be a process of a life style or something that is internalized and practice. Such disaster preparedness fatigue is happening due to the perception that being safe or resilient is an additional burden to individuals or institution. But if individuals, institutions and cammunities treat this as a way of living. Such avoidance of unhealthy food is good but to positively stop the productionsuch and offer viable supply for the live giving ones then that will extend us lives in this world. In so doing, understanding risks must see the interaction of things whether these are life extenders or just a threat. Key players of development must insure that perceived risks are avoided thru life practice that must be translated from one generation to the other. The onset of science must prevent the disasters that happened in China, in Myanmar, Pakistan or in the US. Risilience is not to be waited but it has to be acted upon, risks that that are interacting the vulnerabilities which ultimately become a disaster is not to happen if the size of our fear of our experiencing it is as big of building resilience. The children and the younger generations must compensate the failures of the adults in massive multiplication of relevant efforts. Early warning systems, Risk assessment and identification creative solutions to all the DRR efforts. .
Unfortunately our memories have short shelf lives. I live on the Gulf of Mexico and worked the disasters of hurricanes like Katrina, the Enterprise tornado and others. I am at the University of South Alabama College of Medicine and direct a disaster training center. This year, after two mild hurricane seasons, we are seeing training and preparedness fatigue. I think this is due not only to mild hurricane seasons, but perhaps a seemingly endless barrage of perhaps overstated threats such as H1N1 which in turn has produced skepticism among many health care providers. Consequently complacency is simply one factor we must deal with in our quest to build more local resiliency. We must also be mindful of other human factors, where not every intended outcome is achieved by our actions. With some humor I note that unhealthy food choices actually increased in fast food restaurants that added the option of a healthy side. What that means to me is the need to constantly evaluate the messages of preparedness/threats and the messengers of these messages to make sure our intended outcomes are met. .
I share the concern of Baltz Tribunalo. The same situation exists with the danger of nuclear war. The arsenals have been in place and maintained at high-alert levels for decades, and a deadly sense of complacency surrounds them. Just the fact that the threat of nuclear war has been placed in a "low probability event" category speaks volumes about this. That is why I began questioning the methods of assessing risk of this nature, because I believe they are inherently biased by political outlooks and conditioning to shared perceptions which have actually been carefully developed not by scientists, but by focus groups working for agencies paid to "frame" the debate. .
I am the country program advisor on Child Centered Climate and Disaster Risk Management for Plan International-Philippines. My concern is while we have the probabilities that big disasters really happen, how shall we facilitate institutionally to "stop" people's complascency on this kind of risk? ...